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Abstract 
 
Since the ICC has already existed for roughly 13 years, a first assessment of the 
manner of its operations can be made. Based on ICC cases, this thesis first argues that 
the way the ICC conducts itself in international relations equates to constructivist’s 
perceptions about international institutions. It does not possess the ability to coerce 
states to cooperate and behaves like a teacher, educating its members about justice 
and international criminal law, thereby spreading the accompanying norms. But what 
happens, if a member state does not adhere to its obligations towards the ICC? In 
2010, indicted Sudanese President al-Bashir travelled to Chad without being 
extradited to the ICC. This poses a puzzle, since just a year before, in 2009, Chad was 
adamant that it would adhere to its obligations towards the ICC and extradite him, 
should he enter Chadian territory.  Based on the constructivist perception about the 
ICC, this thesis will conduct a case analysis on Chad’s foreign policy shift in order to 
illuminate that ICC member states base their policies and alliances on neorealist 
security considerations. Through the chosen case study, this thesis aims to shed light 
on the clash between the constructivist approach the ICC is taking to reach its goals 
and the neorealist considerations that shape ICC member states’ foreign policies.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	   5	  
Introduction  
 
Since the end of the bipolar Cold War, the International Relations (IR) scholarship 
experienced a new wave of IR theories that attempted to account for the changing 
dynamics of international relations. Whilst realism prevailed throughout the years of 
the Cold War, new IR schools such as constructivism have emerged. IR scholars 
oftentimes find themselves utilizing different IR theories to explain various IR 
phenomena. Moreover, new international institutions are entering the global arena, 
each introducing its unique structure and objectives in the realm of international 
relations. Amongst one of the most remarkable establishments is that of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC or the Court). Its mere establishment baffled 
realists, who could have never imagined governments would pool such significant 
parts of their sovereignty in a multinational judicial institution. Scholars of 
constructivism however were well suited in explaining the creation of the ICC. Most 
significant is that one of the ICC’s objectives is to fight impunity, which opposes a 
norm that has guided the conduct of conventional international politics in the past. 
This poses a theoretical puzzle, as the IR school of realism fails to provide an 
explanation for the described developments. But does this mean that realism and 
derivatives such as neorealism entirely lose their value in IR scholarship?  
 
The puzzle gains complexity when examining the way in which the ICC has operated 
since becoming operational in June 2002. Based on the cases the ICC worked on so 
far, how can one characterize the approach the Court has been taking towards 
achieving its objectives? Moreover, according to the ICC’s founding treaty, the Rome 
Statute, ICC member states are obliged to cooperate with the court in its 
investigations and prosecutions.1 But what happens, if a member state does not adhere 
to its legal obligations to the Court?  
 
As a consequence of the atrocities committed in the Darfur crisis in the early 2000’s, 
the ICC indicted Sudanese President Omar Hussein al-Bashir for five counts of 
crimes against humanity, two counts of war crimes and three counts of genocide, after 
the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) referred the case to the ICC. Since his 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  See	  Rome	  Statute,	  supra	  note	  6,	  art.	  98	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indictment in 2009, however, al-Bashir remains President of Sudan and continues to 
travel to other ICC member states without repercussions. Most remarkable amongst 
them is Chad, which is the first ICC member state that has welcomed a President, 
indicted by the ICC, without extraditing him to the ICC (Riche 2010 and Barnes 
2011). Does the ICC have the power to coerce Chad into fulfilling its obligations 
towards the ICC? This begs the first research question: What IR theory best suits the 
approach the ICC is taking to achieve its objectives? 
 
The outlined conundrum further gains complexity, when considering that a year 
before Chad received al-Bashir in 2010, it presented itself as a fierce supporter of the 
ICC, stating that it would extradite al-Bashir to the ICC, should he enter Chadian 
territory. However, this did not happen. Instead, al-Bashir encountered a red carpet 
and was given a symbolic key to Chad’s capital when meeting Chadian President, 
Idriss Deby. This begs the second research question: What IR theory best explains 
Chad’s shifting foreign policy towards Sudan and the ICC? 
 
In order to illuminate the clash between the way the ICC tries to reach its objectives 
of fighting impunity and global injustice and the actual forces shaping countries’ 
foreign policy decision making processes, this thesis will analyse the following issues. 
First, the ICC’s approach on the stage of international relations will be examined, 
whilst highlighting its similarities to the IR theory of constructivism. Second, a 
qualitative single case study on Chad’s foreign policy’s shift towards Sudan and 
subsequently the ICC will be conducted under the guidance of theory-based 
systematic process tracing, ultimately showing how neorealist assumptions about 
international politics have shaped the foreign policy of Chad.  
 
 
 
Chapter I: Constructivism and the ICC  
 
 
An International Criminal Court (“the Court”) is hereby established. It shall be 
a permanent institution and shall have the power to exercise its jurisdiction 
over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern, as referred 
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to in this Statute, and shall be complementary to national criminal 
jurisdictions. The jurisdiction and functioning of the Court shall be governed 
by the provisions of the Statute.  
– Article 1 of the Rome Statute 
 
As stipulated in Article 1 of the founding treaty of the ICC, the Rome Statute, the 
Court aims to prosecute the most serious crimes of international concern. In doing so, 
the treaty stipulates that the official rank of the individual perpetrator does not shield 
him or her from an ICC persecution. Interestingly, it claims that it possesses “the 
power” to exercise its jurisdiction. But does the Court really posses the power to 
pursue and achieve its objectives? Many scholars would argue to the contrary  
(Tiemmessen 2014, Gegout 2013, Chapman and Chaudoin 2013, Barnes 2011). IR 
scholarship covers the wide spectrum of perceptions about the ICC, ranging from a 
sceptical realist stance, which perceive international institutions such as the ICC as a 
tool for states to spread their interests (Waltz 1979) to a more optimistic constructivist 
stance, which view the ICC as an agglomeration of ideas that derive from individual 
actors (Fehl 2004). Since the Court is still relatively new, most IR scholars examine 
the phenomena of why most nation states give up parts of their sovereignty when 
ratifying the Rome Statute. But now that the Court functions for roughly 13 years, can 
one already categorize what IR theory best suits the approach the ICC is taking to 
achieve its goals? In order to assess which IR theory best suits the categorization of 
the ICC’s approach, its mission and mandate will be examined in light of 
constructivism.  
 
 
 
Constructivism: A Theoretical Autopsy  
 
In international politics the appropriate concerns… of system theory are 
twofold: first, to trace the expected careers of different international systems, 
for example, by indicating the likely durability and peacefulness; second, to 
show how the structure of the system affects the interacting units and how 
they in turn affect the structure. 
-Waltz 1979: 40 
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Conventional constructivist political theory holds the opinion that the formation of 
structures and institutions derive from the interaction of shared ideas. In this way, 
constructivism seeks to explain systems and the interaction between systems and their 
parts. The systemic constructivist Alexander Wendt reduces the central focal points of 
neorealism and neo-liberal institutionalism revolving around anarchy and power 
politics, and instead argues, “anarchy is what states make of it (Wendt 1992). In line 
with this view, economic and military capabilities are not the primary variables 
influencing international politics, but rather how individual states interpret and 
perceive the global system and the distribution of capabilities within it (Hopf 
1998:177). Since constructivists like Wendt do not disregard the systemic forces 
influencing nation-states’ behaviours, these constructivists are referred to as systemic 
constructivists.  
 
Constructivists take a more complex approach to analysing international relations by 
prioritizing ideas and human consciousness, thus the core assumptions are of holism 
and idealism (Baylis, Smith, Owens 2010). Holism is the belief that structures cannot 
be decomposed into individual units and their respective actions, since the structure 
itself is the agglomeration of individual preferences. In turn, structures construct and 
do not solely constrain actors, as is believed in neorealism (Baylis, Smith, Owens 
2011: 163). Idealism refers to the view that ideas shape how we perceive our interests 
and ourselves. In this context, the value of material forces depends on what value 
humans ascribe to them (Baylis, Smith, Owens 2011: 163).  
 
The two central notions of holism and idealism highlight the importance of inter-
subjective meanings, which we attach to social contexts (Hopf 1998 and Katzenstein 
1998: 679). Constructivists do not disagree with the mere perception of the 
international system as anarchic, but hold the optimistic opinion that the effects of this 
system are dependent upon its actors’ interpretations. Moreover, scholars from this 
strand of IR also acknowledge that states try to survive, but that the way in which 
states pursue this is open to interpretation (Weber 2009: 67). According to Wendt, the 
neorealist notion of self-help, which derives from the constraints of the anarchic 
international system, is to be perceived as an institution in itself. This is the case 
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because all states subscribe to the same thoughts and beliefs concerning this specific 
matter and in turn act accordingly, thereby creating a self-fulfilling prophecy.  
 
In moving away from the analysis of quantifiable forces (military capacities and so 
forth), constructivism shifts the focus towards the relationship between structure and 
agency, as well as the internal configurations of the state and its institutional interests. 
With this shift, constructivism does not possess the ability to measure the success or 
failure of international institutions, but rather questions the core assumptions about 
the international system offered by conventional IR theories. Constructivists assert 
that international organizations too are constructed concepts, which attempt to uphold 
and spread their inherent values and ideologies. 
 
In her book (1996), the systemic constructivist scholar, Martha Finnemore, argues 
that international institutions can teach states how to act. She finds that norms of the 
international society are transmitted to states though international institutions. One the 
one hand, nation states learn from other states how to act and react to international 
institutions, but international institutions themselves have the capacity to teach states 
about problems and how to best resolve them. In fact, institutions are perceived as 
teachers who can shape attitudes of states and shape their reactions in order create 
norms. In a case study conducted in her book, she analyses that the International 
Committee of the Red Cross, for example, is able to bring attention of states to the 
sufferings of war. Thereby the Red Cross influences the norms and values of state 
actors, shaping their interests and their subsequent actions.  
 
Zooming in on the role of constructivism in foreign policy, a final relevant remark is 
to be made. The constructivist Jeffrey Checkel opposes the neo-realist and neo-
liberalist view that foreign policy is purely rational. He believes that these positivist 
approaches portray foreign policy making as asocial, since their rationalist approaches 
to the analysis of foreign policy assume there to be no significant effects of 
“meaningful interaction with broader social environment[s].” (Checkel 2008: 74-75). 
Lastly, he draws the distinction between conventional and interpretive constructivists. 
While conventional constructivist see “language as acts of arguing and persuasion that 
may cause a foreign policy decision maker to change his/her mind on an issues”, 
interpretive constructivist conceive language as “structure of meaning –discourses- 
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that make possible certain foreign policy actions”(Checkel 2008: 76-77). In short, the 
type of language applied is believed to have an effect on foreign policy decisions.  
Before connecting constructivism to the way the ICC is conducting itself in 
international relations, the structure and jurisdiction of the Court will be summarized.  
 
 
ICC’s Jurisdiction 
 
The objective of the ICC is to punish the most serious crimes committed at an 
international level and to bring the individual perpetrators to justice, regardless of 
their official rank.2 The conventional norm of immunity is thereby lifted, as the 
Court’s jurisdiction applies to all persons, regardless of their official capacity.3 The 
crimes over which the Court exercises jurisdiction are categorised into a) the crime of 
genocide b) crimes against humanity and c) war crimes.4 The definition of the fourth 
crime, the crime of aggression is scheduled to be voted upon by the ICC’s Assembly 
of States Parties in the year 2017, after which – if it is passed successfully- it will be 
incorporated into the mandate of the ICC.5  The specific definitions of these crimes 
are not relevant to this paper and will thus not be elaborated upon. Noteworthy, 
however, is that the crimes committed must be of ‘severe gravity’. Based on these 
criteria, the prosecutor has on occasion turned down cases due to the lack of severe 
gravity, when contrasted with other atrocities the international community faces.6 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  See	  Rome	  Statute,	  supra	  note	  19,	  art.	  1,	  (informing	  that	  the	  ICC	  has	  the	  ability	  to	  punish	  individuals	  that	  have	  “committed	  the	  most	  serious	  crimes	  of	  international	  concern”;	  see	  also	  Prosecutor	  vs.	  al	  Bashir,	  Case	  No.	  ICC-­‐02/05-­‐01/09,	  Decision	  
on	  the	  Prosecution’s	  Application	  for	  a	  Warrant	  of	  Arrest	  against	  Omar	  Hassan	  
Ahmad	  Al	  Bashir,	  at	  15	  (March	  4th,	  2009),	  http://www.icc-­‐cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc639096.pdf	  -­‐	  accessed	  09.05.2015	  	  3	  See	  Rome	  Statute,	  art.	  27(1).	  4	  See	  Rome	  Statute,	  supra	  note	  19,	  art.	  5	  5	  See	  http://www.icc-­‐cpi.int/en_menus/icc/about%20the%20court/frequently%20asked%20questions/Pages/15.aspx	  -­‐	  accessed	  09.05.2015	  6	  In	  2010,	  a	  case	  was	  rejected	  by	  the	  ICC	  Prosecutor,	  as	  the	  crime	  did	  not	  constitute	  a	  crime	  of	  sufficient	  ‘gravity’.	  See:	  http://www.icc-­‐cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/OTP-­‐COM-­‐Article_53%281%29-­‐Report-­‐06Nov2014Eng.pdf	  -­‐	  accessed	  10.05.2015;	  see	  also	  Yonah,	  Jeremy	  Bob.	  2014.	  “ICC’s	  ruling	  says	  that	  the	  
incident	  did	  not	  rise	  to	  the	  level	  of	  severity	  of	  broad-­‐based	  war	  crimes	  allegations	  
which	  the	  ICC	  is	  empowered	  to	  deal	  with.”	  Jerusalem	  Post.	  11.06.2014.	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There are three mechanisms through which one of the three crimes mentioned above 
can be referred to the Court. First, a member state can refer a crime to the ICC 
prosecutor. Second the UNSC can refer crimes to the ICC. Finally, the ICC 
prosecutor can open an investigation.7 The ICC only exercises jurisdiction within the 
territories of its member states, unless the UNSC refers a case to the ICC, as was the 
case with the indictment of al Bashir.8 In that situation, ICC’s jurisdiction is expanded 
to the territories of the parties involved. It must be stressed that the ICC only opens an 
investigation, if –in line with the principle of complementarity- it finds that the 
domestic legal system of the country in consideration is “unwilling” or “unable” to 
prosecute the alleged perpetrator.9  
 
The principle of complementarity gives primacy to the domestic legal system of 
member states of states. In order for this to occur, member state need to assimilate 
international legal norms into their domestic legal system and bring it on par with the 
standards of international criminal law, as delineated in the Rome Statute. In this way, 
the ICC spreads norms accompanying the definitions of international crimes to its 
member states, an effect that will be discussed in the final section of this chapter.  
 
 
The Issue Of Non-Cooperation  
 
The ICC is only as strong as its enforcement capacity, and it is dependent on 
states for crucial assistance during all stages of proceedings, particularly for 
the capture and extradition of indicted individuals. 
-Eric Neumayer (2009: 660) 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
http://www.jpost.com/Israel-­‐News/ICC-­‐rejects-­‐pro-­‐Turkey-­‐war-­‐crimes-­‐
allegations-­‐against-­‐IDF-­‐in-­‐Gaza-­‐flotilla-­‐raid-­‐380955	  -­‐	  accessed	  15.05.2015.	  7	  See	  Rome	  Statute,	  art.	  13	  8	  See	  Relationship	  Agreement	  between	  the	  United	  Nation	  and	  the	  International	  Criminal	  Court,	  Oct.	  4,	  2004,	  U.N.	  Doc.	  A/58/874,	  arts.	  2,3	  (recognizing	  that	  although	  the	  ICC	  is	  independent,	  the	  ICC	  and	  the	  UN	  cooperate);	  see	  also	  Rome	  Statute,	  supra	  note	  6,	  art.	  13(b)	  9	  See	  Rome	  Statute,	  supra	  note	  19,	  at	  11	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ICC’s member states are –as stipulated in the legally binding Rome Statute- obligated 
to cooperate with the ICC in its investigations and prosecutions.10 If, however, a 
member state fails to meet this obligation, the Rome Statute does not provide an 
independent mechanism with the power to coerce its member state to cooperate. The 
Rome Statute states that in the case of non-cooperation, the ICC can “refer the matter 
to the Assembly of States Parties (ASP) or, where the Security Council referred the 
matter to the Court, to the Security Council.”11 In short, the ICC does not have 
independent mechanisms to coerce states to adhere to their obligations. Needless to 
say, this characteristic does not reflect the notion of an institution that possesses the 
ability to facilitate its ambitious objectives, such as fighting impunity and arresting 
incumbent heads of state, as in the case of al-Bashir.  
 
In domestic state apparatuses, the judicial system makes use of other state organs, 
such as the police force. The ICC, on the other hand, does not posses its own police 
force. What happens, if a state fails to meet its obligations? Countries that did not 
cooperate in the arrest and surrender of al-Bashir have -at most- been subjected to 
verbal condemnation by the Court and NGO’s.12 Considering that al-Bashir continues 
his presidency in Sudan and still travels to other ICC member states13, it has been 
shown that these verbal condemnations do not carry sufficient weight to make ICC 
member states comply with their obligations towards the ICC. 
 
Matters are complicated even further, when the UNSC refers a crime that has not been 
committed in the territory of an ICC member state to the ICC. In this case, the ICC 
can refer the case of non-cooperation to the UNSC. This has been the case for Chad, 
after it allowed al-Bashir to enter its territory, despite having ratified the Rome 
Statute. The ICC made requests to the UNSC, ICC’s ASP and Chad to support it in its 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  See	  Rome	  Statute	  ,	  supra	  note	  19,	  art.	  86-­‐87,	  at	  60	  (asserting	  that	  member	  states	  must	  “cooperate	  fully	  wit	  the	  Court	  in	  its	  investigation	  and	  prosecution	  of	  crimes	  within	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  Court”	  and	  that	  the	  ICC	  may	  make	  specific	  requests	  to	  the	  member	  states	  asking	  for	  cooperation).	  11	  See	  Rome	  Statute	  art.	  87(7),	  at	  61;	  also	  see	  Kaul	  &	  Kress,	  supra	  note	  38,	  at	  217	  (arguing	  that	  although	  the	  Rome	  Statute	  gives	  the	  ICC	  the	  ability	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  UNSC,	  there	  is	  no	  “explicit	  solution”	  described	  in	  the	  Rome	  Statute).	  12	  See	  http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=darfur	  -­‐	  accessed	  25.05.2015	  13	  See	  http://bashirwatch.org/	  for	  updated	  list	  of	  countries	  al-­‐Bashir	  has	  travelled	  to	  since	  his	  ICC	  indictment	  in	  2009	  -­‐accessed	  28.05.2015	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investigations against al-Bashir on numerous occasions, but the response has been 
ineffectual, resulting in a deadlock for the ICC and its objectives.  
 
 
The Clash Of ICC’s Objectives And The Customary International Principle Of Head 
Of State Immunity  
 
In the past, conventional diplomacy was facilitated through the concept of diplomatic 
and head of state immunity, as stipulated in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic 
Relations, which was adopted on 18 April 1961 and implemented on 24 April 1964. 
The treaty put forth that government officials are immune to the laws and regulations 
of third party states. Even though the treaty is considered customary international law, 
recent developments in international law seem to suggest that this customary law is in 
flux.  
 
Prime examples for the changing status of immunity under customary law are the ad 
hoc criminal tribunals, such as the International Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), and the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone that were established by the UNSC. All of these tribunals were 
founded to prosecute the most heinous crimes, many of which were orchestrated by 
high-ranking government officials. These tribunals clearly state the perpetrators will 
not be granted immunity based on their official rank.14 As with the ICC, these 
tribunals were established to prosecute the worst international crimes regardless of the 
perpetrator’s official rank. This shows that the international community acknowledges 
the need to prosecute those individuals that are responsible for the most heinous 
crimes and that their official rank should not hinder these prosecutions. 
 
According to Article 27 of the Rome Statute, the ICC will “apply equally to all 
persons without any distinction based on official capacity. In particular, official 
capacity of Head of State of Government… shall in no case exempt a person from 
criminal responsibility under this statute.”15 This Article however appears to clash not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  See	  Statute	  of	  the	  Special	  Court	  for	  Sierra	  Elone,	  supra	  note	  107,	  art.	  6(2);	  ICTR	  Statute,	  supra	  	  note	  110,	  art.	  6(2);	  ICTY	  Statute,	  supra	  note	  107,	  art.	  6(2).	  	  15	  See	  Rome	  Statute,	  supra	  note	  6.	  Art.	  27(I).	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only with the customary international principle of head of state immunity, but also 
with Article 98, which states “The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender 
or assistance which would require the requested State to act inconsistently with 
obligations under international law with respect to the State of diplomatic immunity 
of a person or property of a third state, unless the Court can first obtain the 
cooperation of that third State for the waiver of the immunity.”16 Thereby Article 98 
is designed to avoid any tensions between requests from the Court, with which States 
Parties are to comply, and customary international law providing immunity from 
national proceedings for officials of third states.  
 
The most common interpretation of the effects of these two Articles is that a state 
party may not claim immunity for its own officials, but must respect the immunity of 
the officials of non-state parties. But what happens, when the UNSC refers the case to 
the Court. Is a third party then still to be considered as such, since ICC’s jurisdiction 
widens to all UN members? Unfortunately the Rome Statute does not provide for a 
clear distinction, leaving this matter open to interpretations. Consequently, 
organisations like the African Union and Arab League that oppose the indictment of 
al-Bashir, utilize this ambiguity to substantiate their opposing views.17 Opposing this 
ambiguity, Bohlen (2010) correctly notes that since Sudan is a member of the UN and 
the UNSC has a special relationship with the ICC, al-Bashir’s indictment is sound. 
This is so, because the UNSC has the power under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to 
maintain peace. Resolution 1674 affirms it to have “the responsibility to protect 
populations from genocide war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity.”18 Nothing is mentioned about the UNSC not being allowed to utilize a 
third party to achieve this goal, thereby legitimizing the use of the ICC. This means 
that despite arguable ambiguities, the ICC continues to contribute to the demise of the 
customary law revolving around impunity. 
 
Teaching About Justice  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  See	  Rome	  Statute,	  supra	  note	  6,	  Art.	  98(1).	  	  17	  See	  Trevelyan	  Laura.	  2008.	  “UN	  Urged	  to	  Support	  Sudan	  Arrest.”	  BBC	  News.	  04.12.2008.	  http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7892063.stm	  -­‐	  accessed	  29.05.2015.	  18	  See	  UNSC	  Resolution	  1674	  |	  4,	  U.N.	  Doc.	  S/RES/1674	  (28.04.2006).	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This court is not just a system for punishment, it established law … [.s]o, one 
case in the Court makes the reality in the world. 
-Luis Moreno Ocampo19 
 
This statement perfectly resembles the social constructivist approach the ICC is 
taking. As a relatively new institution, its first steps define the scholarship of 
international criminal law. Whatever rulings are made in the beginning, will set the 
precedence for the future decisions to come. With its 123 member states, it is thereby 
spreading norms accompanying international criminal law. But the Court does not 
only spread norms on an institutional level, meaning from the ICC to the domestic 
legal systems of its members, but also in the field in which it operates.  
 
When engaging with victims and witnesses affected by the crimes that fall under ICC 
jurisdiction, ICC field workers oftentimes find themselves teaching the affected 
individuals about their rights. It has to be stressed that many of the affected 
communities live in deplorable living conditions. In the case of the Darfur crises, 
countless NGOs and other multilateral institutions like the UN dedicated significant 
resources to cope with the resultant influx of refugees. This shows that the ICC does 
not just establish law on an institutional level, but also teaches affected individuals 
about justice, as the affected communities oftentimes are not familiar with the 
international criminal legal system.  
  
 
The Indictment Of Al-Bashir By The International Criminal Court 
 
In 2003, two rebel groups, the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and 
Equality Movement (JEM), launched major offensive strikes against the Sudanese 
government. The rebel groups felt politically marginalized and excluded from 
Sudan’s economic development. The brutal government response and its utilization of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  See	  International	  Criminal	  Court	  "Working	  to	  Protect	  African	  Victims",	  AMNESTY	  INT'L.	  5.03.2009.	  http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-­‐and	  updates/featurestories/in	  ternational-­‐criminal-­‐court-­‐working-­‐protect-­‐african-­‐victims-­‐20090305	  	  	  -­‐	  accessed	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the Janjaweed, an Arab militia, resulted in violent clashes with the rebels and the loss 
of countless civilian lives. According to United To End Genocide, so far the conflict 
has claimed approximately 300,000 lives and resulted in 2.7 million peoples internally 
displaced, of which 200,000 fled to neighbouring Chad.20  
 
The deteriorating situation that resulted from the crisis in Darfur triggered a UNSC 
Resolution in March 2005 that referred the situation to the ICC. Four years later, on 4 
March 2009, the ICC issued an arrest warrant for al-Bashir on five counts of crimes 
against humanity and two counts of war crimes. On 12 July 2010, the ICC issued a 
second arrest warrant for al-Bashir on three counts of genocide. This marked the first 
time the ICC issued an arrest warrant based on the crime of genocide.  
 
 
Chad’s Non-Cooperation In The Case Of The ICC Indictment Of Sudanese President 
Omar Al-Bashir 
 
On 13 December 2011, the ICC’s Pre-Trial Chamber I found that Chad had failed to 
cooperate with the Court in the arrest and surrender of Omar Al Bashir during his visit 
on 7 and 8 August 2011.  On 26 March2013, the Pre-Trail Chamber II issued a 2nd 
decision in relation to Chad, as Chad had again failed to cooperate with the Court in 
the arrest and surrender of al-Bashir on the 16 and 17 February 2014.  Both decisions 
were referred to the President of the ICC for transmission to both the UNSC and the 
ASP. Neither the UNSC, nor the ASP has provided sufficient response to ICC’s 
referrals.21 
 
The lack of support has prompted the current prosecutor of the ICC, Fatou Bensouda, 
to halt efforts of the ICC’s Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) to further investigate into 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  See	  Dullaghan,	  Neil.	  “The	  Crisis	  in	  Darfur.”	  http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/crisis-­‐in-­‐darfur	  -­‐	  accessed	  28.05.2015	  21	  See	  United	  Nations	  Security	  Council	  Resolution	  1593	  and	  1970,	  of	  which	  both	  do	  not	  formally	  express	  support	  for	  the	  Court,	  most	  likely	  due	  to	  China,	  who	  holds	  a	  Veto	  power	  and	  who	  still	  invites	  Bashir	  to	  Beijing.	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the crimes committed in Darfur, Sudan.22 In her statement to the UNSC on the 
situation in Darfur in December 2014, she clearly states: “Faced with an environment 
where my Office’s limited resources for investigations are already overstretched, and 
given this Council’s lack of foresight on what should happen in Darfur, I am left with 
no choice but to hibernate investigative activities in Darfur as I shift resources to 
other urgent cases, […].”23 In addition, in the conclusion of her 20th report to the 
UNSC, she reiterates that “without stronger action by the Security Council and State 
Parties, the situation in Sudan is unlikely to improve and the alleged perpetrators of 
serious crimes against the civilian population will not be brought to justice.”24 The 
ICC Prosecutor has in her reports to the UNSC stressed that its support to the ICC is 
of utmost importance, when attempting to bring justice to the victims. Since the 
UNSC has not taken any concrete actions, the ICC’s investigations can not be 
continued and thus, she is forced to halt investigative efforts into this case.  
 
The lack of an independent ICC enforcement mechanisms, its high dependency on 
member states’ cooperation, the ASP and UNSC, and the lack of action taken by these 
three entities in regards to ICC’s operations, illuminate once again how the ICC is 
struggling to reach its objectives. As a result, Prosecutor Bensouda has no other 
choice but to stress the importance of the ICC and its objectives. In doing so, she 
attempts to raise awareness about the grave injustices of the world, hoping for nation 
states to align themselves with the stance of the ICC in its fight against the injustices. 
How this results in a constructivist approach to international stage will be elucidated 
in the final section of this chapter.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  See	  UN	  News	  Centre.	  2014.	  “Security	  Council	  inaction	  on	  Darfur	  ‘can	  only	  embolden	  perpetrators’	  –	  ICC	  prosecutor”.	  	  http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=49591#.VU4URtqqqko	  -­‐	  accessed	  accessed	  09.05.2015;	  see	  also	  AFP,	  Reuters	  and	  AP.	  2014.	  “	  ICC	  suspends	  Darfur	  crime	  investigations	  over	  ‘lack	  of	  action’.	  	  http://www.dw.de/icc-­‐suspends-­‐darfur-­‐crime-­‐investigations-­‐over-­‐lack-­‐of-­‐action/a-­‐18126467-­‐	  accessed	  09.05.2015	  23	  See	  Statement	  to	  the	  UNSC	  on	  the	  Situation	  in	  Darfur,	  pursuant	  to	  UNSCR	  1593	  (2005)	  http://www.icc-­‐cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/stmt-­‐20threport-­‐darfur.pdf	  -­‐	  accessed	  09.05.2015	  24	  See	  20th	  report	  of	  the	  Prosecutor	  of	  the	  ICC	  to	  the	  UNSC	  pursuant	  to	  UNSCR	  1593	  (2005).	  http://www.icc-­‐cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/20th-­‐UNSC-­‐Darfur-­‐report-­‐ENG.PDF	  -­‐	  accessed	  09.05.2015	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Constructivism And The ICC  
 
The preliminary discussion has substantiated the claim that the approach the ICC is 
taking to reach its objectives in the realm of the international system reveals 
significant similarities to the constructivist perception of international organizations. 
This claim is rooted in the following reasons. First and foremost, the ICC challenges 
the concept of immunities granted to sitting head of states, a once-thought-to-be 
customary international law. Moreover, it aims to teach its members about justice. 
Thereby, the ICC is taking upon itself the role of a teacher, teaching states about a 
new set of norms accompanying international criminal law, as embodied by the ICC. 
This heavily overlaps with the view of the constructivists Jeffrey Checkel and Martha 
Finnemore, who see international institutions as tools to spread the norms of the 
international community. According to Finnemore, international institutions have the 
potential to challenge and shape countries’ norms and ideologies. In line with this 
perception, the ICC teaches nation-states how to act and behave in certain 
circumstances. “Constructivism is about human consciousness and its role in 
international life […] rests on […] the capacity and will of people to take a deliberate 
attitude towards the world and to lend it significance [by acting according to that 
attitude]” (Ruggie 1998:855). Former ICC Prosecutor, Luis Ocampo, agrees with this, 
stating that the ICC establishes law, meaning that it attempts to bring justice to 
communities that are not familiar with this construct. The claim that the ICC behaves 
like a teacher of international criminal law is further substantiated when considering 
the principle of complementarity. Through this principle, domestic legal systems have 
been brought on par with the standards of the ICC.25 This shows how the ICC, in line 
with the constructivist view on international organizations, aims to teach its members 
about the importance of fighting global injustices. 
 
Second, due to the limited mandate of the ICC, it is dependent on the UNSC and the 
ICC’s ASP to cope with issues of non-cooperation. If however these two fail to take 
sufficient action, the ICC solely depends on verbal means to further its objectives. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  See	  ICC	  OTP.	  2003.	  “The	  principle	  of	  complementarily	  in	  practice.”	  http://www.icc-­‐cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/20BB4494-­‐70F9-­‐4698-­‐8E30-­‐907F631453ED/281984/complementarity.pdf	  -­‐	  accessed	  29.05.2015	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This was to be seen in the previous section, which highlighted how –in the case of 
Chad’s non-cooperation- the inaction of the UNSC and the ASP result in a deadlock 
for the ICC’s investigations. This overlaps with the constructivist Ruggie stating that 
nature of international relations depends on the willingness of its members. Current 
ICC Prosecutor Bensouda, made this clear when addressing the UNSC, stressing the 
importance of these organs to support the ICC. In doing so, she attempts to shape the 
norms and ideologies of the respective nation-states and assimilate them with those 
represented by the ICC.  
 
In conclusion, this chapter has pointed to the IR theory of constructivism best 
describing the approach the ICC is taking to achieving its goals in the international 
arena. The ICC challenges the once customary international law of high-ranking 
government officials remaining immune from prosecutions when committing grave 
injustices. Consequently, it teaches its members, as well as other actors of the 
international system, a new set of norms that have by now come to be agreed upon 
and accepted by the international community. , Despite major powers like the US, 
Russia and China not ratifying the Rome Statute, the fact that the ICC currently has 
123 member states further shows that a majority of the international community, 
which comprises 193 nation states, is in favour of the ICC and the norms 
accompanying its objectives.  
 
 
Chapter II: Neorealism And Chad’s Foreign Policy  
Neorealism: A Theoretical Autopsy  
 
In order to illuminate how systemic security considerations triggered Chad’s foreign 
policy change, the underlying assumptions of neorealism will be outlined. Special 
attention will be paid to the notion of foreign aid, alliance formation, bandwagoning 
and balancing in the context of neorealism, as they are of particular interest to the to-
be-conducted case study analysis.  
 
Unlike classical realists, who believe the root cause of conflict to derive from human 
nature, neorealists argue that the origin of conflict lies in the unregulated and anarchic 
structure of the international system (James 2002). Within this international system 
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there are primary and formally equal actors, namely sovereign states, who do not 
recognize any higher authority. The lack of authority creates a security dilemma, in 
which states can never be sure of each other's intentions, and therefore arm 
themselves for the sake of security, which in turn causes other states to feel insecure 
and arm more heavily (Waltz 1990:117). Subsequently, a system based on the 
principle of ‘self-help’ is created (Zakaria 1998). Due to this environment, states 
replicate each other on the unit level in order to stay competitive, ultimately leading to 
the balancing behaviour. Given this view, neorealists claim that countries base their 
foreign policy on the existence of what they see as a Darwinian world in which power 
is the key to the national survival of the fittest.  Sterling-Folker writes: “In an 
environment as dangerous as anarchy”, those who ignore realist principles will 
“ultimately not survive” (Sterling-Folker 1997; 18). 
 
The renowned neorealist Kenneth Waltz (1979) dismisses classical realism, because 
he perceives it to be an idea revolving around power, rather than a complete theory 
like neorealism (Waltz 1990: 71).  To date, neorealism has been divided into two 
main categories, namely offensive and defensive realism. Waltz’s version of 
neorealism has been labelled as defensive neorealism, while John J. Mearsheimer is a 
renowned scholar of offensive neorealism. Both offensive neorealist John J. 
Mearsheimer and defensive neorealist Kenneth N. Waltz root their perceptions about 
international relations in the following assumptions: a) the international system is 
anarchic b) states focus on their own survival and c) states tend to balance against the 
strongest by developing their relative power capabilities through internal means, such 
as strengthening their military capabilities and, if possible, by external means, such as 
alliances (Mearsheimer 2001 and Waltz 1979).  
 
Defensive and offensive neorealists differ, when interpreting the abovementioned 
assumptions and making predications about what strategies states pursue, when 
pursuing survival. Offensive neorealists believe that in order to ensure survival, states 
strive towards military hegemony, which implies conquering and dominating other 
nations. Defensive realists believe this to be unnecessary and take a more moderate 
position, arguing that states must be strong enough to resist potential aggression. 
Defensive neorealists take their analysis a step further and counter-argue offensive 
realists, making the claim that if states do pursue military hegemony, it antagonizes 
	   21	  
other states, incentivising them to punish the state striving towards hegemony. 
According to defensive neorealists, military expansion only occurs when the setup of 
the international system is favourable towards it, meaning there is a power vacuum. 
Overall, however, defensive realists take a more nuanced stance and believe that if a 
state pursues security and survival, moderate strategies are the most conducive to 
survival.  
 
Walt (1985) modifies the popular neorealist theory of ‘balance of power’ and offers 
interesting insights into the dynamics of alliance formation. Borrowing on Waltz’s 
version of neorealism (1979), he suggests that when confronted with a threat, states 
that are weaker than the aggressor have two strategies to choose from, namely 
bandwagoning and balancing. Bandwagoning implies that the state under threat allies 
with the state that poses the major threat, while balancing entails that the state under 
threat allies with the opposition to the threat.  
 
Walt further elaborates on the notions of balancing and bandwagoning, by 
extrapolating the role of ideology and foreign aid into the discourse of bandwagoning 
and balancing. The author makes interesting arguments that are of relevance to the 
case study of Chad’s foreign policy. Walt finds that if the state is in a secure situation, 
it will align itself with those that are closest to its own ideological preferences. 
However, “when faced by great danger, one takes whatever allies one can get” (Walt 
1985: 24). He draws upon the famous quote of Winston Churchill, who stated “if 
Hitler invaded Hell, I should at least make a favourable reference to the Devil in the 
House of Commons” (Churchill 1950: 370). In brief, security considerations prevail 
over ideological preferences and alliances that are based on ideological denominators 
are unlikely to survive, once pragmatic interests intrude (Walt 1985: 24).  
 
Concerning foreign aid, Walt acknowledges that oftentimes ‘aid relationships’ result 
from ideological alignment and don’t independently cause the alignment. He finds 
that in the case of an aid-based alliance, the recipient of foreign aid oftentimes 
bargains harder, as the perception of stakes is higher on that end. If the recipient’s 
interests are not being served sufficiently, the recipient can always threaten to switch 
to another ‘provider’. Henry Kissinger provides an interesting example when 
describing his bargaining process with Israel during his “step-by-step” diplomacy, 
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stating, “I ask [Israel Prime Minister] Rabin to make concessions, and he says he 
can’t because Israel is weak. So I give him more arms, and he says he doesn’t need to 
make concessions because Israel is strong.”26 Kissinger’s quote portrays that despite 
potential dependency on foreign aid, states oftentimes have the option to defy their 
patrons on important issues.27 
 
Finally, Walt proposes four criteria by which the threat of another state can be 
evaluated; first, the aggregate strength is measured by the size, population and 
economic capability, second, the geographical proximity, third the offensive 
capabilities and fourth the offensive intentions. Even though Walt fails to clarify how 
much weight should be attributed to each of these criteria, he holds the opinion that 
not solely capabilities, but also perceived intentions matter in the evaluation of threat.  
 
The insights offered by the IR theory of neorealism will be tested against Chad’s 
foreign policy in the case analysis. The research question “Why does Chad not adhere 
to its obligations towards the ICC?” will be assessed through the analysis of bilateral 
relations between Chad and Sudan. In the context of this analysis, Chad’s relation to 
the ICC will be scrutinized.  
 
 
Methodology: Hall’s Systematic-Process-Analysis  
 
In order to identify the causal process behind the shift in foreign policy of Chadian 
President Idriss Deby, the methodology of Peter Hall’s theory-orientated systematic-
process-analysis (SPA) will be applied. For this, it is of utmost importance to take 
clear and well defined ‘snap shots’ of key moments that are relevant for this research 
(Collier 2011).  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  Quoted	  in	  Sheehan,	  Edward	  R.F.	  1976.	  The	  Arabs,	  Israelis,	  and	  Kissinger.	  Pleasantville:	  Reader’s	  Digest	  Press.	  Pp.	  199.	  	  27	  For	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  historical	  record	  on	  this	  topic,	  see	  Walt,	  Stephen.	  “The	  Origins	  of	  Alliances,”	  Chapter	  8;	  see	  also	  Keohane,	  Robert	  O.	  1971.	  “The	  Big	  Influence	  of	  Small	  Allies.”	  Foreign	  Policy.	  Vol	  2:	  pp	  311-­‐313,	  350-­‐355.	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Hall’s theory-orientated SPA is characterized by “elucidating and testing a theory that 
identifies the main determinants of a broad class of outcomes and attaches special 
importance to specifying the mechanisms whereby those determinants bear on the 
outcome […] The focus is elucidating the process whereby the relevant variables has 
effect” (Hall 2008: 306). He commences his model by specifying a set of assumptions 
put forth in the IR theories under consideration that identify relevant causal factors 
and assume those to interact and operate in certain ways. Depending on the theory 
applied, predictions about the causal mechanism of a certain phenomena are made. 
After having provided a clear outline of the theory’s predictions, the predictions will 
be compared to the actual outcomes, thereby testing the theories’ validity. In short, 
the patterns observed in the real world will determine the theory’s validity (Hall 2003: 
391-2). Hall maintains that systematic process analysis is an epistemologically 
superior methodology because it has the capability to map the ontological 
complexities of the social world and also rule out competing theories. A final key 
characteristic of this methodology is that when drawing conclusions, this 
methodology places emphasize on the congruence between prediction and 
observations, rather than between interactions and causal chains.  
 
This methodology will be applied to the analysis of Chad’s foreign policy. For this, 
key events that have shaped the bilateral relations between Chad and Sudan before 
and after they signed a peace agreement in 2010 will be examined. In doing so, Walt’s 
four criteria of evaluating threat will be tested to help explain for Chad’s shifting 
stance towards the Sudan and the ICC.  
 
 
Case Selection 
 
Chad is of particular interest for several reasons. First and foremost, Chad is the first 
ICC member state that, despite having an obligation to cooperate with the ICC, hosted 
Sudanese President Al Bashir in its territory after the warrant of arrest was issued 
against him by the ICC. After visiting Chad in 2010, al Bashir travelled to 13 more 
countries without any repercussions. By analysing possible explanations as to why 
Chad does not cooperate, light might be shed on reasons as to why other ICC member 
states also do not adhere to their ICC obligations. Second, Chadian President Idriss 
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Deby radically changed his stance towards the ICC from first fiercely supporting it to 
then completely disregarding it.  It is this shift in Chad’s foreign policy towards 
Sudan and subsequently the ICC that is under scrutiny in the case study.  
 
To further sharpen the focus of the research, the time frame under consideration will 
be narrowed down to 2005 until 2015. The scope of this time frame is of relevance to 
this research, as 2005 marked the start of hostilities between the two countries, which 
further deepened until 2010, when the Peace Agreement between the two countries 
was signed. Idriss Deby was an outspoken supporter of the ICC and its norms until he 
signed a peace agreement with Sudan, causing him to disregard the ICC entirely.  
 
 
Research Method  
 
This research mostly utilizes peer-reviewed articles, books, government-, think tank- 
and NGO-reports that discuss aspects of the matter at hand. Through content analyses 
of these sources, this paper aims to identify Chad’s foreign policy towards Sudan and 
the ICC. Due to language restrictions, mainly sources written in English are 
processed. Therefore, it is likely that the utilized sources inhibit a bias against Sudan, 
since the majority of the English speaking countries oppose the Sudanese leadership. 
Another bias that deserves acknowledgement is that most English-written sources 
favour the ICC, derived from the fact that a vast majority of English-speaking 
countries are strong supporters of the ICC.  
 
Moreover, the validity and wholeness of the sources need to be treated with caution, 
because of Chad’s poorly developed bureaucracy and infrastructure. This caution is 
emphasized by the fact that in Chad only 37% of the population that is of age 15 or 
older can actually read and write Arabic or French (CIA Factbook 2012). Moreover, 
the CIA ranks Chad 188 out of the 193 countries in energy consumption. This 
suggests that most of the witnesses and participants of the civil wars are not able to 
document and spread their experiences through modern electronic platforms.  
 
Despite these shortcomings, the research method applied still contains significant 
value. The sources utilized are deemed credible by prestigious institutions and various 
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governments, who form their foreign policies regarding this matter based on these 
sources.  
 
 
The Chadian-Sudanese Relation Put Into Historical Perspective 
 
Chadian President Idriss Déby seized power from his former mentor and President 
Hisséne Habré in 1990, following a military coup that was backed by Libya, Sudan’s 
al-Bashir, France and Sudanese Zaghawa (Lunn 2012).  Since then, President Deby 
has been able to maintain in power. For Chad, low-intensity conflict in the form of 
armed rebellions and attempted coups by discontented politico-military factions are 
considered normal. The very fact that no Chadian head of state came to power by 
non-violent means further highlights the socio-political environment of Chad (Handy 
2008). 
 
Deby’s main support group is the Zaghawa ethnic group, to which he ethnically 
belongs and which constitutes roughly 20 percent of Chad’s population (Lunn 2012). 
Despite his ethnic connection to the Zaghawa, once faced with internal opposition, he 
applies a mixture of co-option, divide-and-rule and direct repression (Lunn 2012). 
Despite brutal repression against his own kin, Deby’s regime still heavily depends on 
extended family and fellow Zaghawa members (Lunn 2012). Until the escalation of 
conflict in Darfur in the early 2000’s, Idriss Déby was a loyal ally of the Sudanese 
regime in Khartoum. Since 1991, Sudanese rebels (most of which are of Zaghawa 
origin) from both Darfur and South Sudan had been asking Deby for support, but he 
refused in order to maintain good relations with Sudan (Tanner and Tubiana 2007; 
20). 
 
Chadian President Deby was able to maintain good relationship with Sudan until 
roughly 2005. In 2003, for example, Deby still aided Sudanese President al-Bashir in 
fighting both the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality 
Movement (JEM), even though the two groups have strong Zaghawa affiliations. In 
March and April 2003, Deby sent Chadian troops to the border town of Tiné. But, due 
to the Zaghawa background of the Chadian army, it was not very motivated to fight 
fellow Zaghawa fighters. Even though weaponry and ammunition fell into the 
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possession of the two rebel groups, Deby was able to maintain good relations with 
Sudan until 2005 (Meerpohl 2013; 4). Nonetheless, the escalation of the Darfur crises, 
posed a conundrum for Deby. On the one hand, he attempted to maintain good 
relations with neighbouring Sudan. On the other, he also tried to maintain good 
relations with the Zaghawa, a group that at the time being was aiming to topple al-
Bashir’s regime (Meerpohl 2013).  
 
In 2005 rebel groups emerged in Chad that had the objective to overthrow Deby, as 
their pleas for help had been ignored since 1991. Moreover, in 2006, President Deby 
unilaterally changed the constitution of Chad in order to be eligible for another term 
of presidency. This further deepened the distrust amongst his Zaghawa ethnic group, 
forcing Deby to side with the Zaghawa in order to remain in power. As a result, al-
Bashir changed his stance towards Chad and started to support the Chadian rebel 
groups, which attacked a border town in Chad that year. In retaliation, Deby increased 
his support for the Darfurian rebels, resulting in the commencement of a proxy war 
between Chad and Sudan (Tubiana 2011: 16-17). 
 
The UN estimates that between 2003 and 2008, approximately 300,000 people have 
died in the Darfur crisis and 2.7 million people have been displaced.28 Due to Chad’s 
close proximity to Darfur, most of these displaced peoples have fled to neighbouring 
Chad. The refugees fleeing to Chad are one of the primary forces shaping 
deteriorating relations between Chad and Sudan. Resulting from the huge influx of 
refugees into Chad, the livelihood of more than 2 million Chadians had been affected 
by 2009.29 
 
In January 2010, Chad and Sudan signed a peace agreement that resulted in the 
termination of the proxy war. The hostilities between the two countries ended and 
both began to jointly monitor and control the border region. The peace agreement had 
further far-reaching effects that will be discussed in the case study analysis.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  See	  UNICEF.	  2008.	  “Chad	  –	  overview.”	  http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/sudan_darfuroverview.html	  -­‐	  accessed	  25.05.2015	  29	  See	  Darfur	  Dream	  Team.	  2012.	  “Darfur	  Conflict	  Timeline.”	  http://darfurdreamteam.org/the-­‐crisis/timeline	  -­‐	  accessed	  25.05.2015	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There are some key aspects to be taken into consideration from the aforementioned 
passage. From the commencement of his presidency, Deby was faced with a 
conundrum of alliances, between his neighbour al-Bashir and Zaghawa rebels. He was 
dependent on the support of both actors to survive, yet the two warring parties were at 
conflict with one another. In the end, the survival of Deby’s regime most heavily 
dependent on the support of fellow Zaghawa people, forcing him to switch alliances 
and oppose al-Bashir. This remained in tact until Deby and al-Bashir signed the 2010 
Peace Agreement. Below, a map of Chad and Darfur, Sudan: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chad’s Shift In Foreign Policy Towards Sudan And The ICC Before And After 
The 2010 Peace Agreement  
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Chad risks the shameful distinction of being the first ICC member state to 
harbour a suspected war criminal from the Court. 
-Elise Keppler, Associate Director of the International Justice Program at 
Human Rights Watch30  
 
Chad is the first ICC member state, to which a person, indicted by the ICC, has 
travelled without being extradited to the ICC. This is the result of a radical shift in 
Chad’s foreign policy. In order to illuminate how neorealist assumptions have 
triggered a shift in Chad’s foreign policy towards Sudan and subsequently the ICC, 
two time segments will be scrutinized; first, bilateral relations between Sudan and 
Chad prior to the peace agreement and then, bilateral relations after the 2010 Peace 
Agreement. Within both sections tackling the bilateral relations prior and after the 
peace agreement, a subsection in each will point to the implications for the IR theory 
of neorealism and the ICC. 
 
 
State Of Bilateral Relations Between Chad And Sudan Before The 2010 Peace 
Agreement  
 
By the year 2009, bilateral relations between Sudan and Chad had reached their all-
time low. The year before marked the most intense military confrontations between 
the two countries, because rebel groups in both Chad and Sudan attempted to 
overthrow the respective government with the support of the other (Meerpohl 2013; 
5). Previous years (since 2005) were characterised by mutual accusations of 
supporting each other’s rebel groups (Meerpohl 2013; 5). In April 2006 and January 
2008, Chadian rebel groups almost succeeded at toppling Deby’s regime in Chad’s 
capitol, N’Djaména, but due to increased military spending and the support of France 
and the Sudanese rebel group, JEM, President Deby was able to stay in power 
(Tubiana 2008). Similarly, in May 2008, the rebel group, JEM, which had helped 
President Deby just months earlier fight off the insurgency in Chad, penetrated into 
Sudanese territory, almost taking control of the capital, Khartoum. These military 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  See	  Human	  Rights	  Watch.	  2010.	  “Chad:	  Bar	  Entry	  or	  Arrest	  Bashir”.	  http://www.hrw.org/news/2010/07/21/chad-­‐bar-­‐entry-­‐or-­‐arrest-­‐bashir	  -­‐accessed	  29.05.2015	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confrontations were by far the most extreme and most threatening to the national 
interest of the two countries. These military tensions did not diminish in 2009, but 
were repeated along the border region (Sudan Tribune 2009). 
 
The increased tensions between the two countries also prompted Chad to significantly 
increase its military spending. This would not have been made possible without the 
initiation of oil exploration in Chad. In 2003, Chad joined the league of oil-exporting 
countries under the facilitation of the World Bank (Gould, Winters 2012). As a result 
of unsatisfactory redistribution of the oil revenues, however, the World Bank 
withdrew its support for the oil-exploiting project in 2008 (Gould, Winters 2012). The 
effects of this decision can be seen below, in Table 1. The World Bank withdrew it 
support, because President Deby mainly used the revenues made from the oil business 
to further bolster his state apparatus, assimilating it into a highly authoritarian 
political system that was mainly based on patronage (Gould, Winters 2012). In their 
paper, the authors argues that it was due to these revenues that President Deby was 
able to maintain control of the government. Table 1 shows, how since the 
commencement of the oil exploration, military expenditures increased dramatically 
until 2008, which was plagued by the most intense military confrontations. Even 
though no reliable data exists for the time period after the peace agreement, the 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)31 estimates it is likely that 
the military expenditures decreased.  
 
Table 1: Military Expenditures of Chad 
 
Source: SIPRI 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  See	  SIPRI	  is	  a	  renowned	  database	  that	  comprises	  the	  military	  expenditure	  of	  171	  countries	  since	  1988.	  http://milexdata.sipri.org/	  -­‐	  accessed	  28.05.2015	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From 2000 until 2009, Chad increased its military expenditures by 663 percent (Perlo-
Freeman and Brauner 2012: 15). The International Crisis Group (2009: 13) estimates 
that by 2009, Chad’s army had to be “one of the best equipped in sub-Saharan 
Africa”. As Freeman and Brauner (2012), correctly note, oil revenues played a 
significant role in Deby’s regime survival strategies.  
 
Unfortunately, no reliable data is available for Sudan’s military expenditures from the 
year 2007 and onwards. The table below is particularly interesting, as it shows the 
military expenditure in both the percentage of Sudan’s total GDP and US Dollars. 
This is a key distinction to be made, especially when considering that between 2005 
and 2011, Sudan found itself in the transitional phase with South Sudan seceding 
from Sudan after decades of civil war. In this split, Sudan lost 80% of its oil reserves 
to South Sudan. Since this process was initiated by the 2005 peace agreement 
between Sudan and South Sudan, it is important to observe Sudan’s military 
expenditures not just as a percentage of GDP, but also in total spending.  
 
Table 2: Military Expenditures of Sudan 
 
Source: SIPRI 
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Neorealist Security Considerations And The Role Of Foreign Aid And Alliance 
Formation  
 
Next to spending a vast majority of the oil revenues on military equipment, Chad also 
received significant aid from the EU (mostly France) and the UN and the US, without 
which Deby would not have been able to remain in power. Between 2005 and 2009, 
Chad received a total of $10 billion in assistance to the humanitarian crisis that 
resulted from Darfur from the US (Hansen 2011: 587). A stable Chad is important to 
the US in its counterterrorism efforts in the Sahel region. In 2007, for example, the 
US established Africa Command, through which Deby’s regime received military 
training, ammunition and other relevant military support (Wezeman 2009).  
 
On 28 January 2008, the EU launched a military operation, spearheaded by French 
forces, called European Union Force (EUFOR) in eastern Chad and the Central 
African Republic (CAR). With its 3,700 troops, EUFOR is the largest ever-deployed 
autonomous military operation, employed by the EU (Tubiana 2011). EUFOR was 
replaced by the UN mission, Mission des Nations Unies en Republicque 
centrafricaine et au Tchad (MINURCAT) on 15 March 2009. The 2000 French troops 
that operated in Chad and CAR under EUFOR remained in the two countries under 
the mandate of MINUCRAT. Moreover, due to France’s bilateral security agreements 
with Chad, many Chadian military officials were trained in France (Hansen 2011: 
589). In addition, France also provided military aid. In 2008 alone, Chad purchased 
military equipment worth 13 million Euros from France (Hansen 2011: 589). 
 
In line with the previous discussion on neorealism, it can be argued that due to a) the 
conflict with its neighbour Sudan b) the aid it received from the Western countries, 
Chad aligned its foreign policy with institutions (Including the ICC) that these 
countries support, including the ICC. Even though the US is not a member state to the 
ICC, the entire European Union is. Since the EU became involved most actively, it 
embodied Chad’s most crucial ally. Moreover, the mere fact that the ICC indicted 
Sudan’s President, whilst tensions between Chad and Sudan were high, further 
explains why Chad sided with the ICC. This stance was most obvious when in 2009 
the African Union reached a decision, in which it clearly states that it intends to not 
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cooperate with the ICC in regards to the indictment of Sudanese President al-Bashir.32 
The decision reads as follows: 
 
Decides that in view of the fact that the request by the African Union has 
never been acted upon, the AU Member States shall not cooperate pursuant to 
the provisions of Article 98 of the Rome Statute of the ICC relating to 
immunities, for the arrest and surrender of President Omar El Bashir of The 
Sudan is a logical consequence of the stated position of the AU on the manner 
in which the prosecution against President Bashir has been conducted, the 
publicity-seeking approach of the ICC Prosecutor, the refusal by the UN 
Security Council to address the request made by the African Union and other 
important International groupings for deferment of the indictment against 
President Bashir of the Sudan, under Article 16 of the Rome Statute of the 
ICC.33 
 
When the decision was taken by the AU in 2009, Chad however openly opposed the 
above paragraph of the decision and vowed to arrest and surrender al-Bashir, should 
he enter Chadian territory (Oyugi 2014). As Oyugi correctly analyses, the AU 
decision did not influence Chad’s foreign policy. Chad only decided to side with the 
AU decision after the peace agreement was signed and geo-political security 
considerations allowed Chad to do so (Oyugi 2014). This diminishes the legitimacy of 
Chad’s current defence (2010 onwards), arguing that it simply abides by its 
obligations towards the AU.34  
 
Returning to Walt’s four criteria for evaluating threat, relevant analysis can be made. 
First, with its 34 million citizens, Sudan’s population is roughly three times larger 
than that of Chad. Second, Sudan and Chad are neighbours, which means that the 
threat is imminent. Third, Sudan’s GDP is roughly five times that of Chad. Lastly and 
most importantly, Sudan has proven to have malicious intentions towards Chad, as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	  See	  Decision	  on	  the	  Meeting	  of	  African	  States	  Parties	  to	  the	  Rome	  Statute	  of	  the	  International	  Criminal	  Court	  (ICC)	  of	  1-­‐3	  July	  2009,	  Doc.	  Assembly/AU/13(XIII).	  33	  Ibid.	  Para	  8.	  	  34	  See	  Sudan	  Tribune.	  2013.	  “Chad	  urged	  to	  execute	  arrest	  warrant	  against	  Sudanese	  leader.”	  16.03.2013.	  http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article45845	  -­‐	  accessed	  24.05.2015	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outlined above. This suggests that Sudan meets all criteria for Chad to perceive it as a 
threat, thus forcing it to balance against Sudan.  
 
From a neorealist angle, this makes sense for several reasons. As Sudan embodied the 
greatest threat on a systemic level towards the survival of Deby’s regime, Chad 
aligned itself with Western countries and the ICC. Without their support, it is very 
likely that Deby would not have survived the attempted coup d’états. Sudan was 
supporting rebels that tried to topple Deby’s regime and Western countries supported 
Deby, helping him fight off these insurgencies. As a result of the geopolitical setup, 
especially the proxy war with Sudan, and the military support from Western 
countries, Chad ratified the Rome Statute as the ICC too was attempting to prosecute 
Chad’s main source of threat, namely al-Bashir.  
 
 
The Peace Agreement Of 2010 And Its Implications For Sudanese-Chadian Relations 
 
On 15 January 2010, Sudan and Chad signed a genuine peace agreement. The two 
countries agreed to prevent armed groups from using each other’s territories against 
the interest of the other and to strengthen border control. In contrast to previously 
signed peace agreements, this agreement actually resulted in genuine steps taken 
towards a peaceful resolution (Hansen 2011). Amongst the former peace agreements 
is most notable, the bilateral Security Protocol, also called the Tripoli Accord, which 
was signed in 2006. However, since neither of the two governments made any 
considerable concessions, affected people continued suffering.35 After five years of 
mutual accusations and intensified military escalations, both governments realized 
that an absolute military victory was not an option and thus agreed to a peaceful 
resolution of the proxy war (Tubiana 2010). 
 
Following the peace agreement, numerous gestures, speeches and agreements that 
were made by key actors indicate the end of the conflict. First, in his speech in 
Khartoum on 24 February 2010, President Deby stated that he intended “to highlight 
and welcome the availability and flexibility of my brother, President al-Bashir of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  See	  Afrol	  News.	  2010a.	  “AU	  welcomes	  Sudan	  and	  Chad	  peace	  agreement”.	  21	  January	  2010.	  http://www.afrol.com/articles/35124	  -­‐accessed	  15.04.2015.	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Sudan” (Hansen 2011). On the same day, rebel group JEM, which was initially 
supported by President Deby and which had tried to topple the regime of al-Bashir, 
signed a peace agreement with Sudan in Doha. As a part of the agreement, JEM 
leader Dr. Khalil Ibrahim was refused entry into Chad on 29 May 2010. These first 
actions indicate that the peace agreement is legitimate, as it led to additional peace 
agreements being made with other key warring parties. 
 
In addition, on 27 May 2010, President Deby also travelled to Khartoum to take part 
in al-Bashir’s re-inauguration. A grand gesture indicating good relations. Moreover, 
in Khartoum on 21 July both Presidents made promising statements, which, as Al 
Jazeera journalist Mohammed Adow correctly commented, “will open the door 
widely for concessions between the two neighbouring countries”36: 
 
We have both taken new steps to strengthen our brotherly relations. We have 
moved on from the issues that have come in-between us in the past, and now 
our common borders are safeguarded by the new Sudanese forces. Now the 
people of Sudan and Chad move freely and safely across the border. 
-Chadian President Idriss Deby on 21 July 201037 
 
Everything that went on between Chad and Sudan was an accident. We regret 
it enormously. Now we have turned the page. We are working together for the 
interests for our two nations. I always thought of Chad as my second home, 
despite of this war that both of our countries went through.” 
- Sudanese President Omar al Bashir on 21 July 201038 
 
Another decision that underscores the legitimacy of the peace agreement, is Deby’s 
decision to expel MINURCAT. In March 2010, President Deby sent a note verbale to 
UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon that the UN-mission was to leave the country by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  See	  Al	  Jazeera	  news	  report,	  showing	  interviews	  held	  with	  both	  Presidents.	  21.07.2010.	  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cMT_BFQlMEs	  accessed	  24.	  05.2015	  37	  Ibid.	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latest December 2010. 39  This was of utmost importance to al-Bashir, because 
MINUCRAT forces, which were literally on his doorstep together with the ICC arrest 
warrant, embodied a significant threat to his regime’s survival. Lastly, Sudan expelled 
4000 rebels originating from Chad back to Chad between January and November 
2010 (Hansen 2011).  
 
Later in 2011, Chad explained its radically shifting stance towards Sudan and the 
ICC, claiming that it based its refusal to cooperate in the arrest and surrender of al-
Bashir on “the common position adopted by the African Union in respect of the 
international warrant of arrest issued by the Prosecutor against Mr. Omar Al 
Bashir.” 40  This explanation however, seems inconsistent with Chad’s initial 
opposition towards the AU decision. As Phoebe Oyugi points out, the AU decision 
did not influence Chad’s stance towards Sudan nor the ICC.  This once again stresses 
that, as Walt suggests, ideological preferences and moral commitments are subdued 
by security concerns (Walt 1985: 24). This reveals that it was not Chad’s obligations 
towards the African Union nor the ICC that influenced its decision, but rather the 
regional setup that shaped Deby’s regime’s security concern.  
 
The agglomeration of gestures, statements, and actions made and taken by important 
actors shaping Chad’s foreign policy signal that relations between Chad and Sudan 
have significantly improved after the peace agreement of 2010. The two countries 
now jointly monitor the border and the rebel groups have been ‘dealt with’. This 
allows for a relaxation of relations.  
 
 
Neorealist Security Considerations And The Role Of Alliance Formation  
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Contrary to Chad’s Interior and Security Minister’s statement in 2010, just a year 
before, Chad seemed adamant to cooperate with the ICC in the arrest and surrender of 
al-Bashir when opposing the AU decision regarding al-Bashir’s indictment. The 
spokesperson of the ICC, Fadi El Abdallah however notes that Chad remains obliged 
to cooperate in the request for al Bashir’s arrest.41 It appears Chad’s foreign policy 
experienced a radical change.  
 
In times in which Chad was exposed to a significant threat to its regime, Chad sided 
with those who also opposed al-Bashir. The neorealist Walt would agree with this 
strategic alliance formation and states, “when faced by great danger, one takes 
whatever allies one can get” (Walt 1985: 24). Resulting from the 2010 peace 
agreement, however, Chad seems to have shifted alliances away from Western 
countries and the ICC, towards Sudan and the African Union. The earlier discussion 
revealed how neither Chad’s ICC membership nor its AU membership influenced its 
foreign policy, but rather strict neorealist systemic security considerations. As the 
peace agreement unfolded into a betterment of the bilateral relations, it became more 
beneficial regarding Chad’s own security considerations to change alliances. In line 
with these security considerations, Chad expelled troops of its former allies, thereby 
solidifying trust with its new ally Sudan, as these troops posed a threat to Sudan. This 
too confirms the neorealist approach, since the shift in alliance resulted from a shift in 
systemic forces. Walt argues that security considerations prevail over ideological 
preferences and alliances that are based on ideological denominators are unlikely to 
survive, once pragmatic interests intrude (Walt 1985: 24). 
 
Returning to Walt, whilst the first four criteria have remained the same, Sudan’s 
intentions have reversed. This has been shown through the above analysis of the 2010 
peace agreement. Thus, as the threat disappeared, the alliances Chad formed to 
counter the threat became redundant.  
 
Concluding this chapter, it has been shown that the ICC member state Chad based its 
foreign policy on neorealist security considerations. As a consequence, its obligations 
towards the ICC were neglected. After the peace agreement with Sudan, Chad’s 	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Interior and Security Minister, Ahmat Mahamat Bachir, clearly stated “We are not 
obliged to arrest Omar Hassan al-Bashir. Bashir is a sitting president. I have never 
seen a sitting president arrested on his travels by the host country” 42 . The 
spokesperson of the ICC, Fadi El Abdallah however notes, Chad still has an 
obligation to cooperate in the request for al Bashir’s arrest.43  
 
Chapter I shed light on the ICC’s approach to the realm of international relations, 
showing its close proximity to constructivism. It does not posses the power to coerce 
states to cooperate and acknowledges that it is an institution that spreads norms 
revolving around international criminal law. Chapter II depicted how ICC member 
states base their foreign policies more on security considerations, rather than legal 
obligations. Combining the two Chapters, the clash emerged between the ICC’s 
approach to achieving its goals and the systemic forces shaping foreign policies of 
ICC member states. As previously elaborated, this the clash results in a deadlock for 
ICC’s investigations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, the case study depicting Chad’s foreign policy towards Sudan and the 
ICC before and after the 2010 peace agreement with Sudan has shown how neorealist 
security considerations have prevailed over obligations towards the ICC. Of particular 
interest are the observations made on Chad’s alliance formation and the role foreign 
aid has taken within this context. Chad presents an exemplary case to confirm Walt’s 	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  trip”.	  22.07.2010.	  http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2010/07/201072183438656172.html	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  accessed	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neorealist assumption that security consideration prevail over ideology and that 
alliances are formed based on strict security considerations. When the main threat to 
the survival of Deby’s regime originated in Sudan, Chad sided with EU, the US and 
the UN and aligned its ideological preferences with those of the ICC. Once this setup 
changed due to the peace agreement between Chad and Sudan, Chad neglected its 
obligations towards the ICC and expelled military forces of its former allies.  
 
In the beginning of this thesis, the claim was made that the way the ICC conducts 
itself in international relations shows significant overlaps with the constructivist 
perception of international institutions. This claim is based on the fact that it spreads 
norms through the principle of complementarity, does not possess its own 
enforcement mechanisms and solely depends on member states’ cooperation and the 
ICC’s ASP and the UNSC when attempting to fulfill its objectives. Due to the 
inaction of these key stakeholders in cases such as the one of al-Bashir, however, the 
ICC faces a deadlock. The central role of security considerations, which have 
surfaced throughout the case study, sheds light on the instrumentalization of norms 
embodied by the ICC. While it was convenient for Chad to promote ICC and its 
norms, it did so. The moment security considerations altered due to the 2010 peace 
agreement, however, Chad’s membership to the ICC became inconvenient to its 
survival and was thus disregarded.  
 
This thesis hopes to provide interesting insights into the IR theory of constructivism 
and neorealism. Constructivism sheds light on the role of the ICC in international 
relations. Based on the case study, it has been shown that - in line with neorealism - 
both alliances and ideological preferences do not operate independently, but are rather 
formed and shaped first and foremost by security considerations. As soon as the 
alliances and ideological preferences are not aligned with the best strategy that 
ensures regime survival, they are neglected. Ultimately, this means that neither norms 
by themselves nor alliances possess the ability to shape foreign policy.  
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Annex  
 
Policy Recommendation 
Based on the analysis of the case study and the earlier made claims stating that the 
ICC attempts to achieve its objectives through constructivist means, this research 
would humbly propose policy recommendations to the ICC in regards to cases of non-
cooperation.  
 
Before doing so, however, it must be expressed that the ICC is the result of years and 
years of negotiations and is, like the UN, heavily dependent on what its member states 
empower it to do. This means that as long as no consensus can be found as to how to 
improve the enforcement mechanism, the ICC might in the future face similar 
situations as it does with al-Bashir. The ICC is the first of its kind and its objectives 
are ambitious.  
 
The author Gwen Barnes also makes policy recommendations towards the ICC, after 
conducting an analysis of al-Bashir’s indictment, arguing for a strengthened 
enforcement mechanism through incorporating the mechanisms of a) suspension b) 
expulsion and c) UNSC sanctions (Barnes 2011: 1617). This, however, seems 
counter-intuitive. The steps he proposes will most likely incentivize member states to 
abort membership (something that is strictly legally not possible), thereby limiting the 
judicial reach of the ICC.  
 
Opposing Barnes recommendations, it might be more useful to create non-legal 
avenues of communication between the ICC and its member states. We need to 
acknowledge the complexity of international politics and that some member states are 
simply not able to cooperate due to prevailing security concerns. Thus, the Court 
should further engage into dialogues with its member states and seek alternative 
solutions to the issues at hand. Ideally, the option to have non-judicial and non-formal 
meetings should be incorporated, so that representatives of non-cooperating member 
states can comfortably raise their concerns. As could be seen in the case of Chad, 
President Deby prioritized security concerns over Chad’s obligation to cooperate with 
the ICC, as his regime was on the verge of collapse. Therefore, instead of pushing 
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member states away, which negatively effects the judicial reach of the ICC, the ICC 
should work closer with member states to find alternative solutions.  
 
Lastly, its relation to the United Nations Security Council needs to be reassessed. 
Although the UNSC has the ability to refer cases to the ICC, so far it has not been 
supportive in regards to the cases it did refer to the ICC. This burdens the ICC and 
puts its legitimacy into question. The perception that the UNSC is a politicised 
council further questions the neutrality of the Court. Future research could further 
examine these recommendations and test their potency.  
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